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Massachusetts has enacted one of the most
far-reaching state health insurance reform pack-
ages in recent decades. Much attention has been
focused on the act’s unprecedented mandate
that every resident obtain health insurance cov-
erage. However, the act goes far beyond an indi-
vidual mandate to radically change the way
health insurance is bought and sold in the state.
Many observers see Massachusetts’s reforms as a
model for the nation, but a closer look provides
ample reasons to be skeptical. Among them:• The individual mandate opens the door to
widespread regulation of the health care
industry and political interference in per-
sonal health care decisions.  
• The act’s subsidies are poorly targeted and
overly generous.• The Massachusetts Health Care Connector,
which restructures the individual and small
business insurance markets, is a form of
managed competition that has the potential
to severely limit consumer choice.• The act imposes new burdens on business
and creates a host of new government
bureaucracies to manage the health care
system.
Health care needs more consumer control
and freer markets, not more government regula-
tion, controls, and subsidies. The Massachusetts
reform takes us in the wrong direction.
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Introduction
On April 12, 2006, Massachusetts Gov.
Mitt Romney signed into law one of the most
far-reaching experiments in health care reform
since President Bill Clinton’s ill-fated attempt
at national health care. The plan thrust the
state—and potential presidential candidate
Romney—into the forefront of the national
debate over how to improve the U.S. health
care system and extend coverage to the esti-
mated 46 million uninsured people in the
United States.
Among the key components of the bill are
the following:• Every Massachusetts resident will be
required to have health insurance by July
2007. Those who do not receive insur-
ance through their employers or a gov-
ernment plan such as Medicare will be
required to purchase it on their own.1
Failure to comply with this mandate will
result in the loss of the individual’s per-
sonal exemption for the state income tax
in 2007, and beginning in 2008 there will
be a penalty equal to 50 percent of the
cost of a standard insurance policy.2• Low- and middle-income citizens who
do not have employer-provided health
insurance will receive subsidies to assist
them in purchasing health insurance.
The subsidies will be available on a slid-
ing scale to individuals and families
with incomes up to 300 percent of the
federal poverty level.3• A new entity, called the Massachusetts
Health Care Connector, is created to
restructure the individual and small busi-
ness insurance markets. Notably, the
Connector will enable individuals to use
pretax dollars to purchase insurance,
thereby leveling the playing field between
employer-provided and individually pur-
chased insurance.4• Employers with more than 10 workers
who fail to provide health insurance to
their workers will be assessed a fee of up to
$295 per employee.5 In addition, employ-
ers whose workers repeatedly receive
uncompensated care may be subject to
additional penalties.6• Medicaid recipients will eventually be
brought into the private health insur-
ance market on a subsidized basis.
The plan has drawn praise from across the
political spectrum. The conservative Heritage
Foundation was instrumental in designing it
and has called it “one of the most promising
strategies out there.”7 The plan has also been
endorsed by such liberal luminaries as Sens.
Hillary Clinton (D-NY), Edward M. Kennedy
(D-MA), and John Kerry (D-MA).8
Governor Romney has said that he sees the
proposal as a key element in his expected 2008
presidential run, an opportunity to steal a tra-
ditionally Democratic issue. “Issues which have
long been the province of the Democratic Party
to claim as their own will increasingly move to
the Republican side of the aisle,” Romney said
in an interview with Bloomberg.9 Many longtime
political observers seem to concur. 
Yet, there are many reasons to be skeptical.
The individual mandate is an unprecedented
expansion of government power and intru-
sion into the American health care system. It
marks the first time that an individual, simply
by virtue of living in a state, has been required
to purchase a specific government-defined
product. On a practical level, the mandate is
likely to prove unenforceable. More impor-
tant, the individual mandate will almost cer-
tainly lead to a cascading series of additional
mandates and regulations resulting, ultimate-
ly, in ever-greater government control of the
health care system.
At the same time, the law’s subsidies are
both overgenerous and poorly targeted. Many
of those receiving the subsidies will be people
who have health insurance today. Moreover,
the availability of subsidies will encourage
employers to shift their costs by discontinuing
insurance, thereby dumping their workers
into the subsidized public system.
The law is wrong-headed at a more funda-
mental level as well. Governor Romney has
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gone to great pains to differentiate the
Massachusetts law from the ill-fated Clinton
health plan of 1993, and it certainly is less
expensive, prescriptive, and regulatory. How-
ever, at their heart, both are essentially forms of
managed competition. Unlike single-payer
plans or national health insurance, both plans
would leave the provision of health care and
health insurance in private hands, but they
would create an artificial marketplace run
under strict government control. 
Health care needs more consumer control
and freer markets, not more government reg-
ulation, controls, and subsidies. We must
shift the health care debate away from its sin-
gle-minded focus on expanding coverage to
the bigger question of how to reduce costs
and improve quality. That will require the
introduction of market mechanisms to give
consumers more control over and responsi-
bility for their health care decisions. 
Mitt Romney’s Massachusetts reform takes
us in the wrong direction.
The Mandate
Perhaps the most publicized aspect of the
Massachusetts reform is its mandate that every
resident have health insurance, provided either
by an employer or the government or pur-
chased individually. This is, as the Congression-
al Budget Office has noted, an “unprecedented”
level of state intervention in personal decision-
making. It is the first time that a state has man-
dated that an individual, simply by virtue of liv-
ing in the state, must purchase a particular
state-defined product.10
This provision was designed to deal with a
legitimate—if overstated—issue, uncompen-
sated care for “free riders” on the current
health care system. When an individual with-
out health insurance becomes sick or injured,
he or she still receives medical treatment. In
fact, hospitals are legally required to provide
care regardless of ability to pay. Physicians do
not face the same legal requirement, but few
are willing to deny treatment because a
patient lacks insurance. However, such treat-
ment is not free. The cost is simply shifted to
others, those with insurance or, more often,
taxpayers.
The mandate is also an attempt to
“strengthen and stabilize the functioning of
health insurance risk pools” within the insur-
ance market.11 Massachusetts law mandates a
modified form of community rating, which
forbids insurance companies from pricing
their products on the basis of age or health.
That drives up the cost of insurance for the
young and the healthy in order to subsidize
premiums for the older and sicker. The state
also mandates that insurance policies include
some 40 distinct and often-costly benefits, fur-
ther driving up insurance prices. As a result,
many young, healthy people, unable to pur-
chase low-cost catastrophic insurance, have
made the logical decision to simply go with-
out insurance. However, removing the young
and healthy from the insurance pool means
that the people remaining in the pool are older
and sicker. This results in higher insurance
premiums for those who are insured. 
Finally, the mandate is perceived as a
move toward universal coverage. Many of the
law’s proponents have long equated insur-
ance coverage with access to health care and
access to care with better health. Thus, while
the current law falls far short of their goal of
a universal single-payer system, many see an
individual mandate as a move in the right
direction and likely to produce better health
outcomes in the long run. 
At the time the bill was enacted, there were
approximately 550,000 Massachusetts resi-
dents without health insurance, roughly 13.2
percent of the population under age 65.12 This
compares with about 17.8 percent nationwide.
The state spends just under $1 billion per year
on uncompensated care through its uncom-
pensated care pool. Approximately $606 mil-
lion of this is from state funds, which come
from a combination of general revenues,
tobacco settlement funds, and surcharges on
hospitals and private insurance plans. The
insurance and hospital surcharges, which
average about $65 per employee, are eventual-
ly passed on to businesses that offer health
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insurance to their workers. An additional $385
million comes from federal Medicaid funds
that Massachusetts redirects into its uncom-
pensated care pool.13 In fact, it was the federal
government’s threat not to renew the state’s
Medicaid waiver, thereby halting that $385
million, that provided the impetus for the leg-
islature to act.
Although $1 billion seems like a great deal of
money, overall health care spending in Massa-
chusetts tops $40 billion, making uncompen-
sated care pool expenditures about 2.5 percent
of total health care spending.14 Of course, some
additional uncompensated care costs are passed
along, not to taxpayers, but to private payers.
But that is a relatively small amount, estimated
at about 15 percent nationally.15 If those costs
are added to the spending from the uncompen-
sated care pool, total uncompensated care costs
are less than 3 percent of all health care spend-
ing in Massachusetts, at the low end of the
national average estimated at 3–5 percent.16
Uncompensated care, therefore, although a real
problem, is a manageable one that would not
appear to require this type of radical step.
Nor will the individual mandate solve the
problem. Some of the act’s supporters talk
about its covering 85 percent of the state’s
uninsured within three years, bringing total
insurance coverage to 99 percent of the pop-
ulation. In reality, that appears to be wishful
thinking.
To make an individual mandate work, the
state must be able to determine whether resi-
dents are insured or not and to penalize
those who have not complied with the man-
date. Experience suggests the state is ill-
equipped to do either.
Governor Romney repeatedly likens the
health insurance mandate to his state’s man-
date that all drivers have auto insurance. This
is an imperfect analogy, however. First, it has
long been recognized that driving is a privi-
lege, subject to all manner of regulatory
requirements. If one does not like the regula-
tions, including an insurance mandate, one
can choose not to drive. A health insurance
mandate would not give people such a choice.
Second, the reason states mandate auto insur-
ance is for the protection of others rather than
oneself. Massachusetts, like most states, does
not mandate that a person carry insurance for
his own injury or repair costs. 
However, auto insurance does provide a use-
ful guide to how difficult it will be to enforce the
mandate. Massachusetts was the first state to
require the purchase of auto liability insurance
back in 1927. Proof of auto insurance is required
to register a car, and driving without insurance
is subject to a $500 fine.17 Nevertheless, roughly
7 percent of all Massachusetts drivers remain
uninsured.18 That is actually relatively low com-
pared to the other 46 states that require drivers
to purchase automobile liability insurance.
Roughly 14.5 percent of drivers in those states
are uninsured. In some states, such as Texas, the
uninsured motorist rate runs as high as 18 per-
cent. As many as 25–30 percent of Los Angeles
drivers are uninsured. By comparison, in the
three states without mandatory auto insurance,
roughly 15 percent of drivers are uninsured.19 In
fact, millions of Americans purchase “unin-
sured motorist” coverage to protect themselves
in an accident in which the other driver is unin-
sured.
Under the new law, every Massachusetts
taxpayer must indicate on his state tax return
that he, and his dependents, had health insur-
ance coverage during the previous year (with
no lapse longer than 63 days).20 The act is
silent on how the state will verify insurance
coverage of those residents not required to file
(incomes under $8,000 for an individual,
$14,750 if filing jointly). Although presum-
ably many such individuals would be covered
under Medicaid, many Medicaid-eligible indi-
viduals have never enrolled in the program.
After all, some of the nonfilers will be elderly,
homeless, and mentally ill. And roughly 7 per-
cent of uninsured Massachusetts residents are
illegal immigrants.21 Presumably, many of
those people are outside the tax system as well. 
There is also the question of how the state
will deal with the thousands of Massachusetts
residents who are required to file but fail to do
so. Indeed, at least six members of the Massa-
chusetts legislature have failed to file tax
returns in the last few years.22
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The law will likely miss many temporarily
uninsured people who file tax returns. It is
important to realize that when we speak of
550,000 uninsured people in Massachusetts,
or 46 million nationwide, we are merely
speaking of a snapshot in time. That an indi-
vidual is uninsured today does not mean that
he or she was uninsured yesterday or will be
uninsured tomorrow. In fact, most of the
uninsured are uninsured for only a relatively
brief period. For example, when workers lose
their jobs they may lose their insurance, but
they become insured again when they find
new employment. Since the law allows peo-
ple to go without insurance for up to 63 days
(conceivably up to 126 days if the uninsured
spell falls across two different tax years), the
mandate will simply miss many of the tem-
porarily uninsured.
During the program’s first year, the penal-
ty for failing to obtain insurance will be the
loss of the individual’s personal exemption
from the state income tax. The following year,
the real penalty kicks in, a fine equal to 50 per-
cent of the cost of a standard insurance policy.
That has the perverse effect of creating penal-
ties that are large enough to be onerous but
still smaller than the cost of purchasing insur-
ance. Many currently uninsured individuals
may, therefore, make the perfectly rational
though not inexpensive decision to pay the
fine and continue without insurance.
The result of all this is that the act is like-
ly to fall far short of its goal of insuring every
Massachusetts resident.
Although an individual mandate is unlike-
ly to achieve universal coverage or significant-
ly reduce health care costs, it crosses an impor-
tant line, accepting the principle that it is the
government’s responsibility to ensure that
every American has health insurance. In doing
so, it opens the door to further widespread
regulation of the health care industry and
political interference in personal health care
decisions. The result will be a slow but steady
spiral downward toward a government-run
health care system. 
Whatever the initial minimum benefits
package consists of, special interests repre-
senting various health care providers and dis-
ease constituencies can certainly be expected
to lobby for the inclusion of additional ser-
vices or coverage under any mandated bene-
fits package. 
Public choice dynamics is such that
providers (who would make money from the
increased demand for their services) and dis-
ease constituencies (whose members natural-
ly have an urgent desire for coverage of their
illness or condition) will always have a strong
incentive to lobby lawmakers for inclusion
under any minimum benefits package. The
public at large will likely be unaware of the
debate or see resisting the small premium
increase caused by any particular additional
benefit as unworthy of any great effort. It is a
simple case of concentrated benefits and dif-
fuse costs. 
As more benefits are added, the cost of the
mandate will increase. That will place legisla-
tors in a very difficult position. If they increase
subsidies to keep pace with the rising cost of
the mandate, the cost of the program will
explode. On the other hand, if they hold sub-
sidies steady, the increased cost will be borne
by consumers, who will have no choice but to
continue purchasing the ever more expensive
insurance. Since consumers will have little or
no leverage over insurers (they will no longer
be able to refuse to buy their products), they
can eventually be expected to turn to the gov-
ernment for relief.
Attempts to scale back benefits would cer-
tainly meet political opposition from power-
ful constituencies and complaints about
“cuts.” The only other alternative would be for
the government to intervene directly by cap-
ping premiums. Insurers unable to charge
more for an increasingly expensive product
can be expected to trim costs by cutting back
on their reimbursement rates to hospitals and
physicians. The result will ultimately be
rationing, and lack of available health care
goods and services.
One should always be careful of “slippery
slope” arguments. Yet, in this case, we’ve already
begun slipping. Governor Romney originally
proposed a low-cost, no-frills policy with a high
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deductible. However, by the time the legislature
finished with the bill, the required insurance
included all the state’s 40 mandated benefits.
Those mandates include treatment for alco-
holism, blood lead poisoning, bone marrow
transplants, breast reconstruction, cervical can-
cer/HPV screening, clinical trials, contraceptives,
diabetic supplies, emergency services, hair pros-
theses, home health care, in vitro fertilization,
mammograms, mastectomy, maternity care and
maternity stays, mental health generally (in
addition there is a requirement for mental
health parity), newborn hearing screening, off-
label drug use, PKU/formula, prostate screen-
ing, rehabilitation services, and well-child care.
The services of the following providers must
also be covered: chiropractors, dentists, nurse
anesthetists, nurse midwives, optometrists,
podiatrists, professional counselors, psychiatric
nurses, psychologists, social workers, and speech
or hearing therapists. Insurance policies must
also provide coverage of adopted children, hand-
icapped dependents, and newborns.23
It is worth noting that lobbyists spent
roughly $7.5 million attempting to influence
the design of the new Massachusetts plan.24
The money appears to have been well spent.
The individual mandate, therefore, should
not be seen in a vacuum. It is more akin to the
first in a series of dominoes. “If you want to go
down the road of an individual mandate, it’s
necessary to reform the entire health insurance
system to make sure healthy people can get
affordable coverage and sick people are not
priced out of the market,” says Gail Shearer of
Consumers Union.25 By distorting the health
care marketplace, an individual mandate sets
in place a cascading series of additional man-
dates and regulations resulting, ultimately, in a
government-run health care system.
The Subsidies
The number-one reason that people give
for not purchasing insurance is that they can-
not afford it.26 Therefore, under the Massa-
chusetts mandate that individuals buy insur-
ance, low- and middle-income workers will
have to receive some form of subsidy. The
Massachusetts law provides for subsidies on a
sliding scale for those with incomes up to 300
percent of the federal poverty level.27 That
means subsidies will be available for those
with incomes ranging from $30,480 for a sin-
gle individual to as much as $130,389 for a
married couple with seven children.28 A typical
married couple with two children will qualify
for a subsidy if their income is below $58,500.
The subsidies under Governor Romney’s
plan for Massachusetts will cost about $725
million per year, with other aspects of the
program driving total costs to approximately
$1.56 billion.29 To some degree, savings from
reduced uncompensated care payments will
offset the new costs.30 On the other hand,
increased coverage will almost certainly lead
to increased usage, driving up overall health
care costs and necessitating larger subsidies.
A legislative analysis of the plan suggests that
within two years the program will face a
shortfall of at least $160 million.31 Moreover,
if the mandated benefits package increases as
predicted above, there will be pressure to
increase subsidies still further.
There are two significant dangers to subsi-
dies of this magnitude. First, the expansion of
subsidies will greatly increase the number of
people dependent on government. Given that
the median national income is $44,389, the
Massachusetts subsidies extend government
welfare programs well into the middle class.
As with all means-tested government pro-
grams, we can expect this new middle-class
welfare benefit to discourage work, family for-
mation, wealth accumulation, and self-suffi-
ciency, as well as create a voting constituency
for ever-expanding benefits.
Second, the subsidies are liable to squeeze
out unsubsidized coverage, encouraging busi-
nesses to cease offering employer-provided
plans, shifting the cost of insurance to tax-
payers. That crowding-out phenomenon has
been readily apparent with both traditional
Medicaid and the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program. A Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation survey of 22 studies of the rela-
tionship between government insurance pro-
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grams and private coverage concluded that
substitution of government for private cover-
age “seems inevitable.”32 Other studies have
shown that when government programs are
cut back, private coverage increases.33
This last issue highlights yet another prob-
lem with Massachusetts subsidies—they are
poorly targeted. Many of the people eligible
for coverage already have health insurance.
Therefore, the subsidies should be seen, not
just as a method of increasing coverage, but as
a way of shifting a large portion of insurance
costs from individuals to the tax system.
Subsidies become simply another form of
income redistribution. While many taxpayers
may accept such redistribution to the truly
poor, how will they feel about financing trans-
fers to the middle class?
The Connector
Although it has received less media atten-
tion than other aspects of the act, one of the
most significant aspects of the law is the cre-
ation of the Massachusetts Health Care
Connector to combine the current small
group and individual markets under a single
unified set of regulations.34 Supporters such
as the Heritage Foundation consider the
Connector the single most important change
made by the law, calling it “the cornerstone
of the new plan” and “a major innovation
and a model for other states.”35
Both the individual and the small group
markets are highly regulated in Massachusetts,
which makes them inefficient and leads to
higher costs, especially in the individual mar-
ket. The expectation is that combining the two
and establishing a single regulatory system will
make individual insurance more available and
affordable. Supporters suggest that the price of
individual insurance policies could initially
decline by 25–40 percent, though such projec-
tions remain untested.36
The Connector is also intended to allow
individuals and workers in small companies to
take advantage of the economies of scale, in
terms of both administration and risk pooling,
that are currently enjoyed by large employers.
Multiple employers will be able to pay into the
Connector on behalf of a single employee. And,
most important, the Connector will allow
workers to use pretax dollars to purchase indi-
vidual insurance. This will make insurance per-
sonal and portable, rather than tied to an
employer.
The Connector will not actually be an
insurer. Insurance will still be provided by the
private sector. Rather, the Connector will
function as a clearinghouse, a sort of whole-
saler or middleman, matching customers with
providers and products. It will also allow small
businesses and individuals to pool their
resources to take advantage of the economies
of scale available to large group plans.
Beginning in 2007, any individual living in
Massachusetts can purchase an individual
insurance policy through the Connector. In
addition, any business with 50 or fewer employ-
ees can choose the Connector as its group
health insurance plan. If it does, that company’s
workers will be able to choose from the array of
plans offered through the Connector (subject
to restrictions discussed below). Workers will be
purchasing their insurance on an individual
basis, meaning that they will be able to keep the
coverage if they lose their jobs or take it with
them if they change jobs. And, finally, begin-
ning in July 2009, low-income individuals cur-
rently receiving health care through the state’s
public assistance programs will be shifted into
the Connector.
There is considerable disagreement about
what powers the Connector will have to reg-
ulate what insurance products can be sold.
Some restrictions are specified. For example,
the maximum deductible allowed is $2,700
for an individual and $5,450 for a family.
While this conforms to current federal law, it
locks in the status quo at a time when there
are attempts to change federal restrictions on
health savings accounts (HSAs). Moreover,
individuals choosing a high deductible policy
must combine it with an HSA. As mentioned
above, policies must comply with the state’s
mandated benefits (with the exception noted
below). They must also comply with the
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state’s community rating requirements, and
there are other restrictions designed to limit
the ability of insurers to segment the market
according to risk.37
Except for these restrictions, defenders of
the Massachusetts law say that the Connector
has no authority to regulate insurance and
must offer for sale any and all products that
have been approved for sale by the state insur-
ance commissioner. “The Connector will nei-
ther design the insurance products being
offered nor regulate the insurers offering the
plans. Insurers will continue to be regulated by
the state’s Division of Insurance and will be free
to design and price the plans they offer through
the Connector, subject to the provisions of
Massachusetts’ existing insurance law,” writes
Ed Haislmaier of the Heritage Foundation.38
However, others, including many providers and
insurers, take a different view. “The Connector
has a fair amount of discretion to develop its
plans for affordable products,” according to the
Massachusetts Hospital Association.39 A con-
ference committee report accompanying the
bill says that plans “must be approved by the
Connector.”40
The actual language of the law is vague, and
it certainly provides reason for concern. The
Connector is authorized to offer a “connector
seal of approval” to products that provide
“high quality and good value.” The Connector
itself is left to define what constitutes high
quality and good value, but it is significant that
that phrase frequently appears in the legisla-
tion as justification for mandated benefits. The
law is silent on whether products that do not
receive the seal of approval can be sold through
the Connector or, if so, on what terms.41
However, an analysis of the legislation by the
law firm of Ropes & Grey suggests that the
Connector could limit products to those
receiving the seal of approval.42
Regardless of what products the Connector
can theoretically offer, many people who buy
insurance through it will find their choices
severely constrained. That is because anyone
who receives any subsidy is limited to a choice
among a more limited menu of insurance
options that have low deductibles and limited
cost sharing.43 Since 56 percent of the unin-
sured in Massachusetts have incomes under
300 percent of the federal poverty level, more
than half of those using the Connector will fall
under this restriction. For those earning under
the poverty level itself, plans can have neither a
deductible nor any cost sharing or copay-
ments. 
Under the law, health insurance in Massa-
chusetts will have two tiers. Individuals under
300 percent of the poverty level will be locked
into what resembles a “Medicaid plus” type of
program, a privately provided, heavily subsi-
dized and regulated insurance plan. Those with
incomes above 300 percent of poverty will have
more, but still limited, choices.
The law does include a provision allowing
workers aged 19 through 26 to purchase low-
cost, specially designed products offered
through the Connector. Those products may
avoid many of the state’s mandated benefits
(although some of the most expensive man-
dates, including mental health benefits and
prescription drug coverage will still be
required).44 However, it is uncertain how this
provision interrelates with the requirement
that all subsidized individuals must choose
from the more limited array of comprehen-
sive plans. Since presumably most young
people will be eligible for subsidies, it may be
that very few will be able to take advantage of
these policies. For that matter, if the more
comprehensive policies are subsidized, it is
not clear why anyone would want to.
There is no prohibition on selling small
group or individual insurance outside the
Connector. However, because the subsidies
and tax advantages are available only within
the Connector, and because of its competitive
advantage in terms of pooling costs and risk,
the Connector will eventually squeeze out any
outside market. In the end, the Connector will
become a monopsony purchaser of health
insurance similar to the community purchas-
ing pools envisioned under the Clinton health
care plan of 1993.
The Connector is essentially a form of
managed competition with insurance pro-
vided by the private sector but within an arti-
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ficial government-designed and government-
controlled marketplace. Supporters of man-
aged competition are critical of a health
insurance marketplace that they see as “frag-
mented” and “Balkanized”; the Heritage
Foundation argues, “Markets sometimes
work more efficiently and effectively when
there is a single place to facilitate diverse eco-
nomic activity.”45
Supporters of the Connector offer two
analogies, one of which is somewhat inaccu-
rate and the other quite telling. Ed Haislmaier,
for example, likens the Connector to CarMax.
“There are many different kinds of cars to
choose from, all offered through one giant
dealership.”46 However, CarMax is not the only
dealership. If you don’t like what CarMax has
to offer, you can shop on Vehix.com, visit local
dealerships, or simply choose not to buy a car.
No such options will be available under the
Connector. As discussed above, there is likely to
be little or no individual or small group market
outside the Connector. And individuals are
required to purchase insurance under the indi-
vidual mandate.
A more apt analogy is the Federal Employee
Health Benefit Program as suggested by Bob
Moffit and Nina Owcharenko, also of the
Heritage Foundation.47(The Heritage Foun-
dation has promoted the FEHBP as a model
for health care reform at least since 1993.) Like
the FEHBP, the Connector exemplifies the
basic features of managed competition. First,
consumers can choose from a limited menu of
competing insurance plans. Subsidies are
structured so that consumers choosing more
expensive plans have to bear a portion of the
cost. And most important, insurers are prohib-
ited from competing on the basis of their abil-
ity to price and manage risk. That is, plans
must accept all applicants and charge everyone
the same price regardless of individual health
risk.48
Because Massachusetts insurers will not be
able to adjust their premiums on the basis of
age, sex, current health, or other risk factors,
they will compete on a very constrained basis.
There is some limited price competition, but
since plans cannot reduce costs by managing
risks, and their ability to reduce cost through
benefit design is also limited, such competi-
tion can occur only at the margins. This is
particularly problematic since inability to
price according to risk generally causes insur-
ers to retreat toward the mean. That results in
an overprovision of services to the healthy
and an underprovision to the sick.
Managed competition is an attempt to be a
little bit pregnant on the question of markets
versus government control. Or, as University
of Chicago law professor Richard Epstein says,
managed competition is “an oxymoron. One
can either have managed health care or com-
petition in health care services. It is not possi-
ble to have both simultaneously.”49
Employer Mandates
The law imposes several new requirements
on businesses. First, all businesses with more
than 10 employees that do not provide work-
ers with health insurance must pay a fee of up
to $295 per employee per year.50 The actual fee
will be determined later and is designed to
roughly mimic the impact of the uncompen-
sated care surcharge on insurance plans.
Governor Romney vetoed this provision using
his line item veto authority, but the veto was
overridden by the legislature. Most observers
believe that employer taxes generally reduce
wages or jobs, or both. Still, as such “play or
pay” mandates go, the levy is relatively modest.
The bigger danger is that it sets up a potential
stream of additional revenue for funding the
growing cost of the program’s subsidies. With
current funding expected to be short of what
is required within a few years, there will be a
strong legislative temptation to see businesses
as a potential funding source.
An additional penalty is imposed on
employers whose workers repeatedly receive
uncompensated care. If a company’s employ-
ees incur at least $50,000 in uncompensated
care, the company may be charged a “free-rider
fee” of up to 100 percent of the cost of the care
in excess of $50,000.51 This is potentially a
much more significant penalty. However,
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companies can avoid this penalty if they offer
their employees a Section 125 plan.
And, finally, all employers with 10 or more
employees are required to offer their employ-
ees a Section 125 plan.52 These are cafeteria
plans, authorized under Section 125 of the
federal Internal Revenue Code, that allow
employees to set aside pretax dollars toward
payment of insurance premiums, medical
care, and dependent care expenses. In many
ways they are similar to HSAs except that
account balances cannot be carried over from
year to year. Companies are required to offer
the plans but not to make contributions to
them.
More Bureaucracy
Although not a central component of the
reform, it is worth noting that the Massa-
chusetts law greatly expands the state’s health
care bureaucracy, creating at least 10 new
boards, commissions, and other institutions. 
For example, the law establishes a Health
Care Cost and Quality Council to promote
“high quality, safe, effective, timely, efficient,
equitable, culturally competent, and patient-
centered health care.”53 This new agency will
“develop goals that are intended to lower or
contain the growth in health care costs while
improving the quality of care.”54 If there was
ever a more permanent and open-ended char-
ter, it is hard to think of it. But if that is not
enough to keep it busy, the council is also
charge with eliminating “racial and ethnic
health disparities.”55
And, just in case the council fails to elimi-
nate those disparities, the law also creates a
Health Disparities Council to address the
issue. There is also a Health Payment Policy
Advisory Board, a Public Health Council, a
Health Access Bureau, a Health Safety Net
Office, and, in a bit of hindsight, a commis-
sion to study the merger of the group and
nongroup markets mandated by the law.56
One wonders why “market-based” health
care reform needs so much more govern-
ment.
Conclusion
Massachusetts’s reforms are an attempt to
address some legitimate concerns. The free-
rider problem of uncompensated care is a real
issue, though much smaller than proponents
of reform assume. A fragmented regulatory
environment has added to costs in both the
small group and individual insurance mar-
kets. And federal tax policy locks workers into
employer-provided health insurance, instead
of allowing them to purchase personal and
portable individual insurance. Governor
Romney and the Massachusetts legislature
deserve credit for trying to deal with those
issues.
The law also contains a few good ideas. For
example, it provides for state tax deductibility
of HSAs. It also allows health maintenance
organizations to offer HSAs.57 Previously, only
preferred provider organizations and fee-for-
service plans could do so. The law also
exempts policies sold through the Connector
from the state’s “any willing provider” require-
ments.58
However, in general, the law takes us in the
wrong direction. If the goal is universal cover-
age, this law won’t get us there. But its individ-
ual mandate does open the door to widespread
regulation of the health care industry and
political interference in personal health care
decisions. If the goal is to subsidize coverage for
people who can’t afford it, this is a remarkably
inefficient approach. The subsidized will
include many people who are already paying
for their own insurance. The subsidies will
encourage businesses to drop coverage they
currently provide, shifting costs to the taxpay-
er. And the subsidies will increase dependence
on government for thousands of middle-class
citizens. Moreover, the law imposes new bur-
dens on business and creates a host of new gov-
ernment bureaucracies to manage the health
care system.
Most important, the law heads down the
road toward managed competition. In that
way it resembles the Clinton health care plan.
Rather than true free-market reform, the law
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creates an artificial marketplace that will ulti-
mately restrict consumer choice and free-
dom. Whatever the benign intent of the law’s
proponents, the Connector puts in place
power to severely regulate and restrict the
insurance marketplace. What health care
needs is more consumer control and a freer
market, not more “management.”
Several states, including California, Louisi-
ana, Maryland, and Wisconsin, as well as the
District of Columbia are reportedly consider-
ing legislation similar to the Massachusetts
law. Governor Romney and others suggest that
it could serve as a model for the nation. “If we
did it there, we can do it in other states,”
Romney said in a speech to the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce.59 The Heritage Foundation has
announced that it is undertaking a campaign
to sell the concept to other states.60
One of the advantages of our federalist
system is that states are able to act as “labo-
ratories of democracy.” With time, we may
see how the Massachusetts experiment turns
out. Until then, there is ample reason for
states and the federal government not to fol-
low its lead. 
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